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Additivity and Complementarity in External
Technology Sourcing: The Added Value of
Corporate Venture Capital Investments
Vareska van de Vrande, Wim Vanhaverbeke, and Geert Duysters
Abstract—Innovating firms often invest in a number of differ-
ent technology projects, in different stages of development, us-
ing a wide range of distinct technology sourcing modes, such as
strategic alliances, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions.
Recently, firms have also gained an increasing awareness of the
potential benefits of corporate venture capital investments. This
paper investigates the particular role of corporate venture capital
investments in the technology sourcing portfolio of firms. More
specifically, we focus on the extent to which corporate venture cap-
ital investments are additive or complementary to other modes of
technology sourcing when explaining the innovative performance
of firms. The results indicate that corporate venture capital invest-
ments are particularly beneficial for the innovative performance
of firms when they are used in combination with other technology
sourcing modes.
Index Terms—Complementarity, corporate venture capital in-
vestments, external technology sourcing, M&As, open innovation,
strategic alliances.
I. INTRODUCTION
OVER the past years, companies have started to open uptheir innovation process [14], [16], [53]. As a conse-
quence, the external acquisition of knowledge has become a
central part of firms’ corporate strategy. Rather than making
ad hoc investments in external technology acquisition, the in-
novation strategy of firms nowadays is more likely to follow
a portfolio approach to the external sourcing of technologies.
An increasing number of authors have called for an integrated
perspective on external technology sourcing in order to account
for the interrelationships that exist among technology sourcing
modes [8], [48], [63]. Using a portfolio approach allows inno-
vating firms to spread their investments along a broader range
of technology projects, in different stages of development. This
also implies that firms use a variety of technology sourcing
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mechanisms to target these different types of resources. In the
past, strategic alliances and M&As have received a lot of at-
tention in the literature as mechanisms to spur the innovative
performance of firms. More recently, another type of technol-
ogy sourcing has emerged: corporate venture capital (CVC)
investments. CVC investments are minority equity investments
in young, start-up firms, and during recent years, these types of
investments have received increased attention both in business
as well as in academia (e.g., [20], [21], [82]).
Prior studies focusing on the relationship between CVC in-
vestments and innovative performance have shown that CVC
investments have a positive effect on the subsequent patenting
rates of investing firms (e.g., [21]). However, the explanation of
these studies on the benefits of CVC investments is limited to a
certain extent. After all, most large diversified companies do not
limit their sourcing strategies to one or two technology sourc-
ing modes. They rather set up a portfolio of innovation projects
ranging all the way from more incremental to high-risk, radical
innovations. To cover this broad range of innovation projects,
firms use a variety of distinct sourcing modes, each with its
own characteristics, advantages, and management challenges.
Thus, in order to fully explain the effect of CVC investments on
innovative performance, it is important to include a more com-
prehensive set of technology sourcing modes that are used by
these firms. Nevertheless, the role of CVC investments within
the technology sourcing portfolio of firms has been largely unad-
dressed in prior research (notable exceptions are [50] and [70]).
In response to this research gap, the current study examines
the effect of using multiple sourcing strategies on a company’s
subsequent innovative performance. Although the focus is on a
broad array of external technology sourcing modes, particular
attention will be paid to the added value of CVC investments.
Because CVC investments are likely to be used next to the more
traditional modes for external technology sourcing, we argue
that the effects of CVC investments cannot be estimated by
looking at them in isolation. In fact, the actual benefits of CVC
investments are likely to be dependent on the overall sourcing
portfolios of firms. Therefore, this paper focuses on the com-
plementarity between CVC investments on the one hand, and
strategic alliances and M&As on the other hand, when explain-
ing the innovative performance of firms. Although prior studies
have looked at complementarity effects of external technology
sourcing (e.g., [5], [8], and [12]), they have not yet explicitly
linked the nature of the interaction between CVC investments
and other technology sourcing modes to innovation. We argue
that CVC investments are additive to other modes of external
0018-9391/$26.00 © 2011 IEEE
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technology sourcing, because they all target different types of
knowledge. Additionally, we argue that CVC investments are
complementary to the other technology sourcing modes be-
cause of the knowledge and experience spillovers associated
with external knowledge acquisition.
As such, this paper contributes to the literature in two ways.
First, as discussed earlier, we incorporate a broader set of tech-
nology sourcing modes that can be used to source technologies
externally and thereby may increase the innovative performance
of companies. By discussing and empirically testing the com-
bined effects of nonequity alliances, equity alliances, M&As,
and CVC investments on the innovative performance of firms
in one single model, this paper adds to the increasing body of
research into portfolio management and alliance portfolios in
particular (e.g., [59] and [63]). Second, since CVC investments
have become a popular way to access external knowledge, this
paper shows whether and to what extent this type of investment
serves as a complement to other external sourcing strategies for
improving firms’ innovative performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First,
we will discuss the role of external knowledge acquisition in
explaining the innovative performance of firms. We will pay
particular attention to the effects of corporate venture capital in-
vestments in combination with investments in strategic alliances
and M&As. Second, we will discuss the concepts of additivity
and complementarity, explaining why corporate venture capi-
tal is not only additive to other modes for technology sourcing
but also complementary. Next, we will empirically test our hy-
potheses using a panel dataset of external sourcing behavior of
innovating firms. Finally, in Section V, we will present and dis-
cuss the results and indicate how future research can build upon
the conclusions of this study.
II. BACKGROUND
A. External Knowledge Sourcing and Innovation
Companies that have decided to source knowledge externally
can choose between a broad range of technology sourcing modes
that they can employ for that purpose. Researchers have studied
the impact of different external modes on the innovation perfor-
mance of companies. Several studies have focused on the effect
of CVC (e.g., [82]), equity and nonequity alliances (e.g., [72]),
and M&As (e.g., [2]) on firms’ innovation performance. How-
ever, even studies that consider two modes to acquire external
technology tend to examine them independently. In turn, we con-
sider these different sourcing modes simultaneously and study
whether a portfolio with a diversified set of different external
technology acquisition modes leads to superior technological
performance compared to firms that rely heavily on one mode
to source external technology.
B. Technology Alliances and Acquisitions
Traditionally, mergers and acquisitions have been regarded as
the primary way for companies to grow and to obtain additional
resources. When sourcing external ideas through a merger or ac-
quisition, the acquired resources are internalized in the investing
firm. Thus, the resources obtained are accumulated to or inte-
grated with the resources that were already present. The general
assumption is that through economies of scope and scale, this
enlarged bundle of resources makes more efficient production
possible and should thus have a positive impact on firm perfor-
mance [58]. In addition, M&As are likely to increase innovative
capabilities of the acquirer because they raise the overall R&D
budget [19]. Moreover, technology buying might speed up the
capability process because a firm instantly gets access to tech-
nology instead of having to develop it from scratch.
Despite these apparent advantages, prior research has shown
mixed results for the overall effect of M&As on the investing
company’s innovative performance. For example, Hitt et al. [42]
found a negative relationship between R&D-related acquisitions
and patent intensity, whereas others found positive effects de-
pending on the nature of the M&As under study. Ahuja and
Katila [2] point toward the fact that nontechnological acquisi-
tions are likely not to provide technological inputs and hence,
cannot be expected to increase the innovative output. In a sim-
ilar vein, other studies revealed positive effects only for related
M&As [35], [81].
Although M&As are still a popular way for firms to achieve
growth, less integrated forms of technology sourcing have also
gained ground. Strategic alliances, such as nonequity R&D
agreements and joint ventures, have become more important
vehicles for knowledge acquisition during the last two decades.
Strategic alliances can roughly be described as “cooperative ef-
forts in which two or more separate organizations, while main-
taining their own corporate identities, join forces to share recip-
rocal inputs [80] and can be divided into equity and nonequity
alliances [44], [84]. Equity alliances involve the transfer of eq-
uity, for instance, through the creation of a new organizational
entity (joint venture), whereas nonequity alliances do not re-
quire the use of equity investments. Despite the possible risks
that are associated with strategic alliances, such as free-riding
and opportunistic behavior [32], the main advantage of strategic
alliances and joint ventures as opposed to M&As is the sharing
of costs and risks, which makes them particularly attractive in
turbulent environments. Sharing the costs and risks connected
to R&D with a partner can be regarded to as an effective way to
manage the uncertainty surrounding this process [33]. Besides,
strategic alliances allow the partners to access only part of each
others’ resources, which is especially valuable when not all the
resources possessed by the partner are sought after by the in-
vesting firm [17]. Additionally, strategic alliances are also more
flexible than M&As. Withdrawing from a strategic alliance or
joint venture is not as complicated and costly as it might be to
divest a prior acquisition. This makes strategic alliances a more
viable alternative to M&As in order to cope with the uncertainty
of R&D in earlier stages of the new business development pro-
cess, when the technology and its potential rewards are not yet
fully known.
There are a number of reasons why it can be argued that
strategic alliances spur innovation. In particular, strategic al-
liances provide the ability to share costs and risks, to integrate
complementary knowledge, and to aim at specific pieces of
knowledge [19]. Their review of prior empirical studies shows
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a strong, positive effect for strategic alliances on innovative
performance [19]. In addition, Stuart [72] finds a positive ef-
fect between strategic alliances with large and innovative part-
ners and innovation improvement and growth rates, and Baum
et al. [7] find that the number of alliances positively affects the
success of biotech start-ups.
C. Corporate Venture Capital Investments
A strategy that has received growing attention more recently
among researchers and practitioners alike is the use of corporate
venture capital. Corporate venture capital (CVC) emerged in the
1960s and can be defined as “equity investment by incumbent
firms in independent entrepreneurial ventures, i.e., relatively
new, not publicly traded companies that are seeking capital to
continue operation” [28]. Although this definition is broad and
may include many types of interorganizational ties, it should be
noted that there are three aspects that distinguish a CVC invest-
ment from a strategic alliance. First of all, the notion of CVC
investments focuses specifically on venture capital investments.
Venture capital investments are usually high-risk investments in
high-tech start-ups. They are typically structured through a ded-
icated venture capital fund, in a number of rounds, and with a
number of coinvestors. Second, managers consider CVC invest-
ments and alliances as distinct activities that have to be managed
in different ways: corporations set up a separate, dedicated or-
ganizational entity with allocated funds to invest in interesting
ventures [13], [14]. Strategic alliances on the other hand, are of-
ten governed by an alliance management department at the cor-
porate level, but also in many cases, managed at the divisional
or business unit level [23], [40], [55]. Third, strategic alliances
imply that the otherwise independent partners become mutually
dependent through their resource commitments in joint R&D. In
a technology alliance, partners strive toward shared objectives
and try to maximize the financial return from their collabora-
tion. In contrast, in CVC investments, the investing company
has different objectives than the management team of the port-
folio firm: the investor invests unilaterally in the portfolio firm
and claims in return several rights.
Prior research has indicated that the motives for companies
to invest in entrepreneurial start-ups range from purely financial
objectives (i.e., return on investment) to more strategic mo-
tivations, such as identifying possible acquisition targets and
obtaining a window on new technologies [24], [49], [71], [74].
As shown in a study by Kortum and Lerner [52], venture capital
activity has significant, positive impact on the patenting rates of
industries, stressing the role of venture capital to spur innova-
tion in general. From an investing firm’s perspective, CVC in-
vestments are particularly interesting to contribute to the firm’s
innovation output, because they enable them to get access to
technologies in an early stage of development, when it is still
too risky to establish equity alliances such as joint ventures.
CVC investments can also serve as a window on emerging tech-
nologies. In that case, it is not even appropriate to establish
strategic alliances until it becomes clear that the technology of
the portfolio firm might have some commercial potential for the
corporate investor.
Because CVC investments are specifically targeted at young,
privately held companies [28], they provide the investing firm
with access to a source of knowledge that might be difficult
to target through M&As or strategic alliances. Moreover, these
new ventures are an important source of innovative ideas that
still need to be further developed or commercialized. Therefore,
getting access to these ideas and technologies at this stage pro-
vides the investing firm with a possible vital source of compet-
itive advantage. After all, breakthrough inventions often come
from new, pioneering technologies [3]. Additionally, it should
be noted that CVC investments are a flexible instrument to invest
in new technologies with unknown future potential. This allows
companies to invest in different, even competing technologies,
with potentially high but also highly uncertain returns. CVC
investments allow the investing company to defer irreversible
investments until new information about the economic viability
of a technology becomes available. Using less flexible modes
of technology sourcing such as equity alliances and acquisi-
tions in this phase might lead to long-term commitments to
technologies that in the end prove not to be viable. CVC in-
vestments allow firms to “explore” a broad range of promising
technologies while not overcommitting themselves to specific
technological trajectories.
A number of prior studies have examined the effect of cor-
porate venture capital investments on the performance of the
investing company. Dushnitsky and Lenox [21] found a positive
relationship between CVC investments and future patent cita-
tion levels, whereas Wadhwa and Kotha [82] found an inverted
U-shaped relationship between CVC investments and the sub-
sequent patent applications rate of investing firms. In addition,
Gompers [27] finds that the success rate of CVC investments
within the same industry is larger than the success rate of non-
related CVC investments, which is partially supported by the
findings of Keil et al. [50]. In a study on the effects of intrain-
dustry, related and unrelated CVC investments, they found a
significant, positive effect for related CVC investments only.
In addition, Dushnitsky and Lenox [22] showed that CVC in-
vestments that focus specifically on strategic outcomes provide
greater firm value than financially focused CVC investments.
To summarize, CVC investments are targeted at young, en-
trepreneurial ventures that are generally regarded as an impor-
tant source of innovative ideas. Getting access to these emerging
technologies provides the investing firm with a viable source of
competitive advantage, leading to increased innovation perfor-
mance. However, as noted earlier, most established, innovative
firms do not limit their sourcing strategies to one mode in par-
ticular. Rather, they invest in a portfolio of technology sourcing
partnerships. Therefore, it is not sufficient to study the effects
of CVC investments in isolation, as the innovation output of the
investing firms might also be the result of other external knowl-
edge sourcing partnerships. Hence, by neglecting the impact of
other sourcing modes, the effect of CVC investments is likely to
be estimated incorrectly as a result of an omitted variable bias.
Consequently, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1. The positive effect of CVC investments when studied
in isolation is overestimated due to an omitted variable bias.
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In order to estimate the true benefits of CVC investments
on innovative performance, they should therefore be studied in
relation to the other strategies for external technology sourcing
that are used simultaneously.
D. Additivity of CVC Investments
Prior studies on the relationship between external technology
sourcing and innovation have found ample evidence that exter-
nal sourcing of knowledge positively affects innovation output
of investing firms. However, this evidence might be biased to
some extent, as the innovative performance of firms may not
necessarily be the result of investing in one particular technol-
ogy sourcing mode, but rather the combined effect of multiple
types of external technology sourcing modes. In order to over-
come this potential omitted variable bias, it is important to look
at the investment portfolio of firms. One of the ways to do so
is by estimating the additivity of different technology sourcing
modes. By additivity, we mean that the combined effect of two
or more activities is equal to the sum of the effects of each of
these activities separately. For two strategies, this can be repre-
sented by the following function: f (x, y) = f (x) + f (y). When
applying this to the notion of external technology sourcing, we
suggest that the total innovative performance of firms is a lin-
ear function of the different technology sourcing modes a firm
undertakes.
After all, CVC investments, strategic alliances, and M&As
serve the same overall purpose: getting access to external knowl-
edge to strengthen a firm’s technological capabilities and perfor-
mance. However, despite this commonality, they all have differ-
ent characteristics as mentioned before, and consequently, they
can be used to target different types of knowledge or knowledge
in different stages of development. We argue that the simul-
taneous use of different external sourcing modes helps firms
improve their innovation performance. The additivity of differ-
ent external sourcing modes is in line with the open innovation
imperative [14]: innovating firms can improve their innovative-
ness when they tap into different types of external knowledge
along the innovation funnel. Innovating firms should not only
collaborate with universities and research labs on new scientific
discoveries that still have to go a long way before they hit the
market, but they should also get involved in CVC, codevelop-
ment with partners, spin-ins, and technology acquisitions. On
the one hand, companies have to source external technologies
to strengthen their current businesses, but on the other hand,
they also need to generate completely new businesses. Firms
can thus benefit from sourcing concurrently different types of
knowledge.
Innovating firms thus have to get involved in different sourc-
ing modes at the same time as each sourcing mode will allow the
company to source a particular type of knowledge. For instance,
due to the irreversible nature of M&As, they are less attractive
in the early phases of development, when the potential value of
the technology is still highly uncertain. Strategic alliances are
more flexible, and they are also valuable for sharing of costs and
risks, which makes them more suitable for codeveloping new
technologies. In this sense, strategic alliances and M&As can
serve as an additional way to source new technologies within
the context of new business development. In turn, CVC invest-
ments are especially valuable to target knowledge that is in an
early stage of development and which is often privately held.
Because these kinds of technologies might be more difficult
to target through an acquisition or through the use of strategic
alliances, CVC investments can play an important role here.
Moreover, even when a strategic alliance or M&A is a viable
sourcing mode, they may be less attractive because they do not
have the desired level of flexibility.
Several scholars ([78], [79], [86]) have argued that in the
face of high technological and commercial uncertainty, firms
are likely to delay their investments in certain technologies. In
this case, they make small investments in a certain technological
field in order to build familiarity with this new field. A recent
survey [60] has shown that CVC investments are typically made
in earlier-stage technologies or in technologies that are noncore
to the company. Given the fact that different technology sourc-
ing modes are effective in targeting different technologies or
innovation stages, one can expect that firms will benefit from
establishing different types of sourcing modes resulting in a di-
versified portfolio of channels to tap into external technology.
Furthermore, not only technological uncertainty is important in
this context but also endogenous uncertainty arising from the
dissimilarities among partners plays a role in technology sourc-
ing mode choice [78]. For example, in the case of dissimilar
technology bases, firms are likely to opt for CVC investments
over strategic alliances and M&As. Hence, different governance
modes play a different role in the external sourcing of technol-
ogy, depending on aspects such as the stage of development
of the technology and the level of uncertainty surrounding the
investment decision. Being involved in a broader portfolio con-
sisting of different types of technology sourcing modes is there-
fore an important way for innovating companies to get access
to various types of knowledge in different stages of develop-
ment. In the long run, being involved in different strategies that
cover the various stages in the technology development funnel
enhances the variety of technologies that is invested in, thereby
increasing the innovative performance of the firm [7], [66].
Consequently, engaging in different types of external technol-
ogy sourcing modes is an important way for firms to improve
their innovative performance. Companies will optimally profit
from external sources of technology when they can tap into
external technology at the right stage of their development. De-
pending on a firm’s innovation strategy and the type of external
knowledge, it might choose to be involved early on in a technol-
ogy development or it might wait until the technology is further
developed and has proven to be a commercially valuable tech-
nology. Hence, firms need different types of external technology
sourcing modes to assimilate knowledge in different stages of
development. Investing in CVC investments, next to strategic al-
liances and M&As, will therefore increase the innovative output
of investing firms. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2. Corporate venture capital investments are additive to
other modes of external technology sourcing.
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E. Complementarity of CVC Investments
Besides the additivity of different technology sourcing modes,
another interesting aspect is whether different technology sourc-
ing modes are complementary to each other. The notion of com-
plementarity is closely related to the concept of superadditivity
or supermodularity [61]. Supermodularity occurs when “adding
an activity while already performing the other activity has a
higher incremental effect on performance than when doing the
activity in isolation” [12]. Mathematically, this can be repre-
sented as: f (x, y)≥ f (x) + f (y). The two activities x and y can
then be regarded as complements. In practice, the forces of both
additivity and complementarity can work at the same time. Ad-
ditivity indicates that innovating companies benefit when they
deal simultaneously with technologies that are in different stages
of development (see Hypothesis 2), whereas complementarity
arises from reputational effects, and knowledge and experience
spillovers between the different sourcing modes.
With respect to different technology sourcing modes used
for external technology sourcing, complementarity means that
there is a symbiotic relationship between the different tech-
nology sourcing modes and that their joint effects on a firms’
innovation performance is stronger than their sole effects. Ac-
tually, the notion of complementarity suggests that each tech-
nology sourcing mode not only has a direct effect on the inno-
vative output, but that each technology sourcing mode also pos-
itively affects the relationship between other technology sourc-
ing modes and the innovative performance of firms. The com-
plementarity between CVC investments and other technology
sourcing modes can result from different drivers. We first fo-
cus on knowledge spillovers as well as experience spillovers.
First, CVC investments enable learning about new technologi-
cal knowledge, which increases the absorptive capacity of firms.
By making small investments in entrepreneurial start-ups, in-
vesting firms gradually expand their technological knowledge
base, and consequently, also expand their absorptive capacity.
This increased absorptive capacity improves the extent to which
the firm is able to recognize, assimilate, and exploit the techno-
logical knowledge obtained through the use of other technology
sourcing mechanisms. A broad portfolio of technology sourc-
ing modes can allow firms to draw knowledge from multiple
external sources, thereby providing them with information ad-
vantages and knowledge spillover effects. Ties to a large number
of different sources might provide firms with the opportunity to
better assess the specific value of the knowledge gained from a
particular technology sourcing mode. This process of triangula-
tion [26] is seen as an important aspect of assessing information
with a high novelty value. As a result, we can expect that the
required knowledge to source external technology effectively
through strategic alliances, for instance, is leveraged by the ex-
isting CVC investments and vice versa.
In addition, recent work [4], [18], [39], [69] has shown that
prior engagement in strategic alliances can lead to future suc-
cess because experience helps firms to gain knowledge about
critical processes and issues in dealing with alliances. Similar
reasoning applies to CVC investments and M&As. Through ex-
perience, firms accumulate a collective understanding of the ex-
ecution of organizational tasks involved with external sourcing
of knowledge, which, in turn, leads to more refined and efficient
processes over time [84]. As a result, there are learning effects
from external knowledge sourcing that enable firms to be more
efficient in using external acquisition modes [39]. Similarly,
making small, learning investments made through CVC invest-
ments may also lead to experience spillovers [85]. This implies
that by experimenting with CVC investments, the investing firm
creates management skills in the recognition, absorption, and
assimilation of external knowledge, which can also be applied
to other governance modes in the technology sourcing portfolio.
Overall, this increased external sourcing experience would be
beneficial to the whole sourcing portfolio, as it also enhances
the effectiveness and efficiency with which knowledge is being
targeted and transferred through other governance modes.
The complementarity of different sourcing modes should,
however, not be limited to knowledge and experience spillovers.
Different external sourcing modes also provide access to com-
plementary resources [20]. Arora and Gambardella [5] argued
that one type of external resource frequently increases the need
for other types. For example: car manufacturers who invest in
technology savvy start-ups to come up with new hybrid cars
will also have to establish technology alliances with battery
manufacturers. As complementarity of external resources is as-
sociated with each type of external sourcing modes, we can ex-
pect that higher technological performance will result from the
combination of different external technology sourcing modes.
In addition, having more alliances, acquisitions, and CVC in-
vestments provide also greater visibility and prominence to the
innovating firms. When a company invests in several CVC in-
vestments and has the reputation to be a reliable and trustworthy
investor, it will have an advantage in establishing new technol-
ogy alliances or to negotiate an acquisition of high-tech start-
ups. But also the opposite is true: a firm may leverage its alliance
network and track record of high-tech acquisitions to enhance
visibility among the VC community in order to legitimize new
CVC investments. Consequently, firms that rely on visibility
and reputational effects will establish new external sourcing
activities more effectively and with more interesting partners,
leading to a stronger innovative performance compared to their
competitors that cannot benefit from strong visibility.
Based on these different arguments, we argue that CVC in-
vestments enhance the relationship between strategic alliances
or M&As and innovative performance. In other words, CVC
investments are expected to be complementary to other modes
of external technology sourcing.
Hypothesis 3. Corporate venture capital investments are comple-
mentary to other modes of external technology sourcing.
III. DATA AND METHODS
A. Sample
To test our hypotheses, we use a sample of firms that were ac-
tive in the pharmaceutical industry between 1990 and 1997. The
dataset was constructed in the following way. For each year of
the observation period, the 200 largest innovative companies
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in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry were se-
lected. Following Rothaermel and Hess [67] and Rothaermel and
Thursby [68], companies active in pharmaceutics and biotech-
nology are those that are active in the following patent classes,
defined by the USPTO: 424, 435, 436, 514, 530, 536, 800, and
930.1 Large innovating firms are more likely to engage in exter-
nal technology sourcing activities and are more likely to report
them publicly [50]. Prior research on alliances and acquisitions
has for that reason also focused on the largest companies in the
industry [1], [31], [42], [50]. After selecting the companies with
the largest cumulative number of patents in the relevant patent
classes, research institutes and universities were removed from
the sample. Next, the remaining sample was manually checked
for parents and affiliates using Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns
Whom, which were then aggregated on parent company level.
We will refer to these independent companies as “focal firms,”
to distinguish them from their partners.
Next, we have gathered information on all the venture cap-
ital investments, technology alliances, minority holdings, joint
ventures, and merger and acquisitions of these firms during the
period 1985–1996,2 as well as patent data and financial infor-
mation. Corporate venture capital data were derived from the
Thomson VentureXpert database, data concerning alliances and
joint ventures were obtained from the MERIT-CATI Databank
on Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators [33],
and we used Thomson ONE Banker to collect information re-
garding the companies’ M&A activity. Because both the col-
lected alliances and corporate venture capital investments have
a strong technology component, we included only technology
related M&As in our sample, following the method by Ahuja
and Katila [2]. The final sample comprises 4,302 technology
sourcing deals.
Patent information until 2003 was collected for all firms in-
cluded in our sample using data from the US Patent and Trade-
mark Office. Because the US Patent and Trademark Office
grants patents both on subsidiary as well as on parent com-
pany level [64], and the organizational level on which patents
are applied for differs between companies, we consolidated the
patents on parent company level for each observation year, using
Who Owns Whom by Dun & Bradstreet. In addition to that, we
gathered financial data using Worldscope, including sales and
research and development expenses.
B. Variables
1) Dependent Variable: Our dependent variable, innovative
performance, measures the innovation output of the focal firms.
1Description of the patent classes is as follows: 424: drug, bioaffecting and
body treating compositions; 435: chemistry: molecular biology and microbiol-
ogy; 436: chemistry: analytical and immunological testing; 514: drug, bioaffect-
ing and body treating compositions; 530: chemistry: natural resins or deriva-
tives; peptides or proteins; lignins or reaction products thereof; 536: organic
compounds; 800: multicellular living organisms and unmodified parts thereof
and related processes; 930: peptide or protein sequence.
2Longer time lags are used because of the use of patent citations (a patent
can only be cited after it has been issued which takes, on average, 3 years for
the firms in our sample). In order to avoid right censoring of the data, we take
1997 as the last observation year for the dependent variable.
Patent counts have often been criticized as an indicator for in-
novative performance because this measure gives an identical
weight to each patent application, and hence, does not capture
the importance of the innovation [34], [76]. In order to cap-
ture the value of innovation, we therefore use patent citations,
or weighted patent counts [76]. Weighted patent counts (WPC)
is also a count variable, but each patent i is now weighed ac-
cording to the subsequent citations Ci it receives, assuming that
more important patents receive more citations and vice versa.
Weighted patent counts for n patents applied for in year t can





Patent citations were collected until 2003, and in order to avoid
right-censoring problems, we took 1997 as the last year of the
observation period. As the time horizon of the dataset is limited
and we are not able to observe all possible forward citations for
each patent, we use the simulated cumulative distribution lags
developed by Hall et al. [36] to estimate the total number of
citations each patent is likely to receive. The simulated cumu-
lative distribution lags show the yearly distributions of the total
citations a patent is likely to receive. Using these distribution
lags, we are able to estimate the total number of citations a
patent will receive, based on the cumulative number of citations
till 2003, the last year of our observation period.
In addition, we studied the additive effects of CVC invest-
ments on exploratory innovation, including novel, emerging,
and pioneering technologies [3] as independent variables. The
variable novel technologies is measured as the number of new
technology classes that are entered in the year of observation.
Emerging technologies is calculated as the number of patents
that cite technologies that are, on average, less than 2 years old.
Finally, pioneering technologies is calculated as the number of
patents that cite no other patents.
2) Independent Variables: Hypothesis 1 predicts a direct
relationship between CVC investments and innovative output.
Therefore, for every observation in year t, we counted the num-
ber of CVC investments in the 5 years prior to the observation
year (t − 1 to t − 5). This moving window approach is consid-
ered to be an appropriate timeframe during which the existing
portfolio of external technology activities is likely to have an in-
fluence on the current technological performance of a firm [31],
[47], [72]. This line of reasoning has been confirmed by a robust-
ness check in which we also computed the independent variables
using a 4-year window. The 4 years and 5 years lagged variables
were highly correlated (r > 0.95 in all cases) and the estimation
results using the 4-year lagged variables were very similar to
the results presented in this paper.
Next, we are interested in the additivity and complementarity
of CVC investments vis-a`-vis the other modes for technology
sourcing such as strategic alliances and M&A activities. Accord-
ingly, we have calculated the number of nonequity alliances,
equity alliances, and M&As as additional variables. Equity al-
liances are strategic technology partnerships that involve the
use of equity investments, such as joint ventures and minority
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TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS
holdings (less than 50% ownership). For every observation year
t, we counted the number of times each technology sourcing
mode was established in the five years prior to the observation
year (t − 1 to t − 5).
3) Control Variables: We included technological capital or
patent stock as a measure of a firm’s technological strength
(e.g., [21], [47], and [80]). This variable is computed as the
cumulative number of patents applied for by the focal firm in
the 5 years prior to the observation year t. A moving window of 5
years is the appropriate time frame for assessing technological
impact [1], [41], [65], [73]. Studies about R&D depreciation
[29], [30] suggest that knowledge capital depreciates sharply,
losing most of its economic value within 5 years.
R&D expenditures can be seen as a means to generate ab-
sorptive capacity necessary to benefit from external technology
sourcing. We therefore include R&D intensity (R&D expendi-
tures as a percentage of sales) as a control variable. In addition
to that, we controlled for size (natural logarithm of sales) and we
introduced yearly dummy variables to capture eventual changes
in patent application levels, legal system, or economic environ-
ment. The control variables size and R&D intensity are lagged
by 1 year.
C. Method
The dependent variable of this study, weighted patent counts,
is a count variable. Although Poisson models are often used
to estimate count outcomes, the model, in practice, rarely fits
due to overdispersion [57]. Because our data show significant
evidence of overdispersion (i.e., the variance largely exceeds
the mean—see Table I), a negative binomial regression model
seems to be more appropriate [10], [38], [72]. The negative
binomial model for panel data is estimated using the XTNBREG
command in STATA.
We furthermore employed a Hausman specification test [37]
on the baseline model to determine the choice between a ran-
dom and a fixed effects model. The Hausman test was strongly
significant, indicating that a fixed effects model is the appropri-
ate model for this analysis. Because fixed effects models do not
allow the inclusion of time-invariant variables, region dummies
were not included in the analysis.3
In addition, given the exploratory nature of CVC investments,
we have carried out some additional analyses, using exploratory
3We have also performed a random-effects analysis including industry and
region dummies and found very similar results, underscoring the robustness of
the models presented in this paper.
innovation measures as dependent variables. Different models
were estimated, using pioneering, emerging, and novel tech-
nologies as dependent variables. To enhance interpretability, we
have used a negative binomial model with fixed effects for these
analyses as well.
IV. RESULTS
The descriptive statistics and correlations between the inde-
pendent variables are presented in Table I. As shown in Table I,
there are high correlations among the control variables rep-
resenting the various forms of external technology sourcing
(nonequity alliances, equity alliances, and M&As). These high
correlations are a first indicator for the existence of comple-
mentarity (e.g., [5], [25], and [54]) and they are in line with
earlier findings by Arora and Gambardella [5] and Cassiman
and Veugelers [12]. However, a positive correlation among dif-
ferent strategies is not a necessary, nor a sufficient condition to
assume complementarity [6], [12].
These positive correlations also stress the importance of es-
timating the effects of CVC investments while including other
external sourcing modes in the analysis. Since external technol-
ogy sourcing strategies are highly correlated, the positive effects
of CVC investments found in earlier studies might be the effect
of other, unobserved factors rather than stemming directly from
CVC investments.
Table II presents the results of the negative binomial regres-
sions, using weighted patent counts as a dependent variable.
Table III shows the results for the creation of novel, emerg-
ing, and pioneering technologies, respectively. The first models
present the baseline model, including only the control vari-
ables size, R&D intensity, and technological capital. Model 2 in
Table II, and Models 2, 6, and 10 in Table III present the effect of
CVC investments on innovation outcomes, without controlling
for other modes of external technology sourcing, followed by a
model including the squared term to test for a possible curvi-
linear relationship between CVC investments and performance.
Finally, in Models 4 and 5 in Table II, and Models 4, 8, and 12 in
Table III, we include the other technology sourcing modes, i.e.,
nonequity alliances, equity alliances, and M&As in the analysis.
These variables represent the stock of other external sourcing
activities undertaken by the investing firm in the 5 years prior
to the year of observation.4
4Although the high correlations among the different sourcing strategies stress
our belief that most diversified firms are involved in a large number of external
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TABLE III
FIXED EFFECTS PANEL ESTIMATION RESULTS (PIONEERING, NOVEL, AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES)c ,d
Hypothesis 1 predicted an overestimation of the positive ef-
fects of CVC investments and subsequent innovation output, as
a result of omitted variable bias. Models 2 and 3 in Table II
show that prior CVC investments have a positive, but curvi-
linear effect on weighted patent counts, which is in line with
prior studies [82]. The results furthermore indicate the possi-
technology sourcing agreements, at the same time, they also indicate possible
multicollinearity problems. However, the results in Model 3 indicate that, de-
spite the high correlation among the independent variables (Table I), t-statistics
remain significant indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem here. As a
robustness check, we have performed several additional analyses where 1) the
independent variables were included one by one and 2) where all governance
modes were grouped into one stock variable. The results of these additional
analyses are very similar to the results presented here; indicating that multi-
collinearity between the independent variables is not an issue in this paper.
bility of an omitted variable bias when CVC investments are
studied in isolation, as the magnitude of the direct effect of
CVC investments on innovative performance decreases sub-
stantially when controlling for other modes of external technol-
ogy sourcing (compare Models 2 and 3 to Models 4 and 5 in
Table II). Moreover, the LR test statistics indicate that the mod-
els including the other modes for external technology sourcing
(Models 4 and 5) have a significantly better fit than the model
with only CVC investments included. These findings are cor-
roborated by the results in Table III. In particular, compare
Models 7 and 8, and Models 10 and 12 from Table III, which
show that the positive effects of CVC investments on emerging
and pioneering technologies, respectively, become smaller (and
the significance slightly weaker) when the other sourcing modes
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are included. Together, these findings provide empirical support
for Hypothesis 1.
Next, Hypothesis 2 states that CVC investments are additive
to other modes of technology sourcing. The results in Tables II
and III provide support for the additivity hypothesis (Hypothesis
2). Models 4 and 5 in Table II show that nonequity alliances,
equity alliance, M&As, and CVC investments are all signifi-
cant and positively related to innovation output. The results in
Table III provide varying results. Models 2, 3, and 4 show no
significant effect for the use of CVC investments and the cre-
ation of novel technologies. This implies that CVC investments
do not affect the generation of technologies that are new to the
firm. Model 7 indicates that CVC investments are curvilinearly
(inverted U-shaped) related to emerging technologies. More-
over, this effect holds when other modes for external knowledge
sourcing are included (Model 8), indicating that CVC invest-
ments are indeed additive to other modes of technology sourc-
ing when investing in emerging (or new) technologies. Finally,
Models 10 and 11 show that CVC investments have a positive
effect on the creation of pioneering technologies. However, the
coefficient becomes insignificant when the other modes for ex-
ternal technology sourcing are included. We will elaborate on
those findings in Section V.
A. Complementarity
Next, we analyze to what extent the different modes for ex-
ternal technology sourcing are complementary (Hypothesis 3).
In order to estimate complementarity, there are two methods
that can be found in the literature. First, there is the use of a
production function approach to determine the effects of using
particular combinations of external technology sourcing strate-
gies on a firm’s innovative performance [8], [12], [62]. Using
this approach allows for a direct test of the complementarity
constraints, by testing multiple inequality constraints simulta-
neously [62]. First, for each possible combination of strategies,
a corresponding dummy variable is included to capture whether
or not the firm is involved in that particular combination of
strategies. These dummy variables are then included in a re-
gression analysis, and based on the estimates following from
the regression analysis, a number of inequality restrictions can
be tested. A more detailed explanation of this method can be
found in Mohnen and Ro¨ller [62].
Another method that can be found in the literature is the
use of pairwise interaction terms to assess complementarity [9],
[11], [43], [56]. Using interaction terms allows for the estima-
tion of the amount of interaction between two or more prac-
tices, whereas using a production function with dummies only
provides an insight into particular combinations but remains
silent on the magnitude of the increasing gains of using the one
while already performing the other. However, pairwise interac-
tion terms assume that complementarity exists on the level of
pairs of variables, and does not pick up the effects of multilateral
interactions [83]. In addition, as pairwise interactions are also
used to estimate the “fit” between two variables or the “moder-
ating” effect of one variable on the performance relationship of
another variable, it remains unclear whether the significance of
TABLE IV
COMBINATIONS OF STRATEGIES USED BY FOCAL FIRMS (FIRM–YEAR
OBSERVATIONS)
the interaction term reflects complementarity rather than “fit”
or “moderating” effects [75].
Because the focus of this paper is on the complementarity
of CVC investments vis-a`-vis other strategies in the external
technology sourcing portfolio, we use a production function
with dummies, rather than pairwise interaction terms, to es-
timate complementarity. Following prior studies, we have de-
fined dummy variables indicating the activity of the firms in
our sample with regards to possible combinations of strategies.
Table IV provides an overview of the possible combinations and
the number of firm-year observations indicating involvement in
that particular set of external sourcing modes, using a 5-year
moving window.
Table IV shows that the majority of firms is involved in a com-
bination of nonequity alliances, equity alliances, and M&As.
Combining these three strategies with CVC investment appears
to be a common strategy as well, as is indicated by 98 firm-
year observations depicting this portfolio. Assuming that firms
optimize their portfolio, these figures give some indication con-
cerning additivity and complementarity as apparently firms who
invest in CVC investments are most likely to do so while simul-
taneously investing in other modes of technology sourcing. We
also find pairwise combinations between nonequity and equity
alliances and between these two external sources of technology
and acquisitions. Pairwise combinations with CVC investments
as well as triads including CVC investments seem to be less
popular among the firms in the database.
Next, these dummy variables are included in a negative bino-
mial regression model in order to estimate the effect of particu-
lar combinations of strategies on the innovation performance of
firms. The results are shown in Table V.
The results of the regression analysis presented in Model 1
in Table V indicate that combining nonequity alliances with eq-
uity alliances or M&As positively affect the innovation output of
firms. Moreover, the results suggest that combining nonequity
alliances with equity alliances and M&As, and a strategy com-
bining the four external technology sourcing modes also pos-
itively affect innovative performance. The results in Models 1
and 2 also indicate that using only CVC investments as a way to
get access to external technology does not affect the innovative
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POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF STRATEGIESc ,d
performance of firms. One-sided Wald tests furthermore show
that the coefficient of using a combination of nonequity al-
liances, equity alliances, M&As, and CVC investments is greater
than the coefficient for using a combination of nonequity al-
liances, equity alliances, and M&As but no CVC investments.
This indicates that CVC investments are additive to nonequity
alliances, equity alliances, and M&As when used simultane-
ously, thereby providing additional support for Hypothesis 2. A
portfolio consisting of CVC investments next to the more tra-
ditional modes for external technology sourcing has a positive
effect on innovation performance.
However, these results do not yet indicate the existence of
complementarity between the different external sourcing modes.
In order to test for complementarity using the results from a pro-
duction function model, a set of multiple inequality restrictions
needs to be tested simultaneously (for an overview and expla-
nation, see Mohnen and Ro¨ller [62] and Belderbos et al. [8]). In
order to conduct the complementarity tests, one needs to have
coefficient estimates of all possible strategies. Unfortunately,
our dataset does not include observations for firms who have
invested solely in CVC and equity alliances, or CVC, equity al-
liances, and M&As (see Table IV). Moreover, there is only one
observation for the combination M&A and CVC investments.
Hence, we are not able to follow the direct test for complemen-
tarity as suggested by the authors mentioned earlier. Therefore,
we have also estimated a model using a single dummy variable
for all other technology sourcing strategies (nonequity alliances,
equity alliances, and/or M&As). The results of this analysis are
presented in Model 2 of Table V. Firms that only tap into external
technology sources through CVC investments are not perform-
ing better than other companies—this contrasts with the positive
impact of other technology sourcing modes. However, CVC in-
vestments in combination with other technology sourcing modes
improve firms’ innovation performance significantly. With only
two groups of external technology modes, we need to test only
one inequality constraint: (1,1) + (0,0) − (1,0) − (0,1) ≥ 0.
We have tested this inequality constraint using a Wald test. The
result of this test shows that this inequality constraint holds, and
thus, indicates that CVC investments are complements to other
governance modes.5 This result confirms Hypothesis 3. CVC
investments are not only additive to other modes for external
technology sourcing; they can also be regarded as complemen-
tary. The implications of these findings will be discussed in
Section V.
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have examined how different modes for
external technology sourcing affect the innovative performance
of investing firms. Focusing on CVC investments, which are
a relatively new vehicle for technology sourcing, we have esti-
mated the direct effect of these investments on innovation output
followed by an investigation of the effects when these invest-
ments are combined with the more traditional ways of tech-
nology sourcing, such as nonequity alliances, equity alliances,
and M&As. We have argued that CVC investments are both
additive as well as complementary to other technology sourc-
ing modes. They are additive because they all target different
types of knowledge and are complementary too because of the
specific knowledge and experience spillovers associated with
external knowledge acquisition.
The results confirm the findings of prior studies that CVC
investments have a positive and even curvilinear effect on sub-
sequent innovative performance (e.g., [21] and [82]). When not
controlling for other technology sourcing modes, the relation-
ship appears to be inverted U-shaped, while the squared term
becomes insignificant when the other modes are included in the
model. Next, the results of this study indicate that including
other strategies for technological search provides a richer ex-
planation of the role of different modes for external technology
sourcing and, as a result, that the effects of CVC investments
should not be studied in isolation. The results presented in Mod-
els 3 and 4 in Table II indicate the existence of a potential omitted
variable bias and stress the importance of including the whole
portfolio of technology sourcing modes that a company has at
its disposal.
The results in this study furthermore show the role of CVC in-
vestments in improving innovation performance when they are
used jointly with other technology sourcing modes for external
5We first test the null hypothesis H0: (1,1) + (0,0) − (1,0) − (0,1) = 0. This
hypothesis is rejected (Chi2(1) = 2.65∗). Next, we test if (1,1) + (0,0) −(1,0)
− (0,1) ≥ 0 which is confirmed (p = 0.95).
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knowledge acquisition. The results not only indicate that CVC
investments are additive to other modes for technology sourc-
ing, they also support the complementarity hypothesis when
CVC investments are combined with other technology sourcing
modes. Combining CVC investments with nonequity alliances,
equity alliances, and M&As positively affects the innovation
rates of the investing firm. This supports our call for a portfolio
approach to external technology acquisition research in general
and CVC investment research in particular. More specifically,
firms that have a diversified external sourcing portfolio are likely
to benefit from their investments in different external knowledge
sourcing modes.
Finally, the results of this study indicate that CVC investments
are particularly interesting when a firm seeks to invest in the cre-
ation of pioneering and emerging technologies. The results in
Table II show no relationship between CVC investments and the
creation of novel technologies, indicating that CVC investments
are not well-suited to explore into new technological domains.
This is in line with Keil et al. [50] who showed that the benefits
from investing in CVC are greatest when investments are made
in related industries. Furthermore, CVC investments are found
to be more impactful when firms seek to operate on the forefront
of technological development. Some prior research has shown
the benefits of CVC investment for exploratory inter-firm learn-
ing [70], thus implying that CVC investments are an important
vehicle to enable the investing firm to operate on the technolog-
ical frontier by developing newly emerging technologies.
This study contributes to the existing body of research in
a number of ways. First, we combined the different modes
of technology cooperation a company can use to get access
to external knowledge in one single model (including CVC
investments, nonequity alliances, equity alliances, and M&As).
Although prior research has extensively investigated the
performance effects of CVC investments, strategic alliances,
and M&As separately, studies combining different modes
are relatively scarce (exceptions are [50], [87]). Since most
large firms are engaged in different technology partnerships
at the same time, henc including all those possible technology
sourcing strategies in one model provides a richer description of
the dynamics when firms pursue a more open way of innovation.
By doing so, this paper also contributes to the increasing body
of research on portfolio diversity (e.g., [46], [59]).
Additionally, this paper sheds more light on the role of CVC
investments, by stressing the unique benefits of these invest-
ments for the overall innovation performance of firms, as well
as for the creation of exploratory innovation. Moreover, the
results show how CVC investments can increase innovation
performance when used in combination with the other modes
of technology partnering, especially when used simultaneously
with technology sourcing modes that target a more mature type
of technology as opposed to the relatively new technologies that
are aimed at through use of CVC investments.
A. Implications and Future Research
The findings of this study have important implications for
management. First, they show that CVC investments can have a
positive effect on a firm’s subsequent innovative performance.
Moreover, the results indicate the importance of CVC invest-
ments for exploratory innovation. Investing in CVC, next to
the traditional modes of technology sourcing, can help or even
make a difference for the subsequent creation of pioneering and
emerging technologies. This implies that managers should care-
fully consider the motives behind investing in CVC, and the
type of exploration that is sought.
Moreover, our findings suggest that CVC investments are
highly complementary to other technology sourcing modes and
should thus be used in conjunction with these modes rather
than as a stand-alone investment strategy. In line with the im-
perative of open innovation [14], the current study stresses the
advantages of the simultaneous use of different external sourc-
ing modes at a particular point in time. Firms can improve their
innovation performance by tapping simultaneously into differ-
ent external technology sourcing mechanisms. In particular, the
results of this study show that combining CVC investments with
nonequity alliances, equity alliances, and M&As positively af-
fects the innovation rates of the investing firms. This implies that
managers must carefully design their external sourcing portfo-
lio. Particularly with an increasing interest nowadays for the use
of CVC investments, managers need to be aware of the fact that
CVC investments in early stage technologies are mostly benefi-
cial when used as part of a broader technology sourcing portfolio
and in combination with alliances and acquisitions of technolo-
gies that have already been further developed into marketable
innovations. As a consequence, firms should think about exter-
nal technology sourcing as a portfolio of investments, which re-
quires a more centralized approach toward investment decisions.
Of course, this study is not without limitations. The first lim-
itation regards the use of weighted patent counts to measure
innovation output. Although patent indicators are widely used
as a proxy for technological knowledge (e.g., [34] and [45]), it
should be noted that there is also a significant share of knowl-
edge created within the firm that cannot be captured in patent
information. Furthermore, improvements in technology do not
necessarily lead to a better financial performance of a com-
pany. Technological knowledge is not the same as successful
new product introductions that lead to a surge in sales. In future
research, more advanced combined measures of innovative per-
formance, based on a combination of measures of new product
introductions, patents, and licenses might further sophisticate
our approach.
Another aspect regarding measurement is that we have mea-
sured CVC investments by counting the number of investments.
For M&As and alliances, we take on a similar approach. How-
ever, investments might differ significantly in terms of size.
Some CVC investments amount to several hundred thousand
dollars while others might account for investments of millions.
Also comparing CVC investments or alliances to large M&As
that require investments of over 100 million dollars might create
a potential bias in our results. Future research might enhance the
value of our contribution by including the financial investments
made in a particular mode.
In addition, the current study does not take into account the
availability of internal human capital, for instance, in the form of
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star scientists [67]. Internal human capital may play an important
role in the transfer and accumulation of external knowledge,
and hence, in the innovation outcomes of external technology
sourcing. Although the internal resources of firms are partially
captured by their patents stocks and their R&D expenditures,
adding a measure of internal human capital may improve our
understanding of how internal resources interact with external
technology sourcing.
This study focuses on three main modes of external knowl-
edge acquisition: strategic alliances, M&As, and CVC invest-
ments. Firms, however, also employ other forms of external
knowledge acquisition of which the most important one is li-
censing [77]. As a result, it would be logical to include licensing
deals as another external technology sourcing mode. However,
there are two main reasons not to do so. First, there is a practi-
cal problem; licensing deals are not documented in large-scale
databases in a way that is compatible with the other technol-
ogy sourcing modes. Second, there is a more fundamental rea-
son. CVC investments, technology alliances, and acquisitions of
small technology firms are instrumental in the development of
new technologies in the focal company. Licensing agreements
usually focus on the exchange of a ready-to-use technology.
Hence, licensing is generally not geared toward the exploration
of new technology, but rather focuses on the exploitation of ex-
isting technologies and will not allow the investing firm to build
a competitive advantage based on its technological superiority.
Similarly, arms-length technological contracting and licensing
deals may be more interesting to improve noncore technologies,
rather than to upgrade core technologies [15]. Future research
could extend the current study by indicating the different roles
these external technology sourcing modes play within an open
innovation strategy. In this way, technology contracting and li-
censing could be integrated alongside alliances, acquisitions,
and CVC investments as different channels to source technol-
ogy from the outside.
Moreover, prior research in the field of open innovation has
also indicated the importance of informal relationships, for in-
stance, through professional conferences, meetings, fairs, and
exhibitions [53]. These informal knowledge channels may also
play an important role in the knowledge acquisition process
(next to the formal collaboration efforts), as full understanding
of different external sourcing mechanisms would benefit from
including both formal as well as informal sources of knowledge
and relationships.
Finally, in this paper, we have studied the impact of CVC in-
vestments on the innovative performance of firms and the extent
to which these types of investments are complementary to other
modes of external technology sourcing. However, we do not
take a truly dynamic perspective on external technology acqui-
sition. Alternative to analyzing the impact of external technol-
ogy sourcing at the firm level, one could focus on the innovation
project level by tracing the sequencing of different external tech-
nology modes over time; CVC investments are often regarded
as a first-stage investment that might evolve in another type of
mode when the technology further matures. CVC investments,
strategic alliances, and M&As are all part of a broader spectrum
of technology insourcing that can be used sequentially when a
technology becomes more mature. Future research into the dy-
namics of CVC investments as a first-stage investment should
be conducted in order to get the full picture of how CVC in-
vestments as an initial investment in new technology projects
can add value for firms. For instance, applying a real options
logic to the external sourcing of technologies (e.g., [51]) might
lead to the suggestion that strategic alliances or M&As after an
initial CVC investment improve innovative performance.
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